The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency on Monday, Oct. 3.
This dispute began in 2007 when the Sacketts (private citizens) wanted to build a home on their property. The Environmental Protection Agency directed the Sacketts to halt construction because the property contained wetlands. The Clean Water Act gives the agency the authority to regulate “navigable waters”, which is defined in the act only as “waters of the United States.” The agency currently interprets its mandate to include protecting wetlands, such as marshes and swamps.
The Clean Water Act was passed by Congress in 1972 based on its power to “regulate commerce among the several states” under Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. The act is justified by the need to protect the environmental integrity of waterflows in the U.S., which are essential to commercial activity involving every state.
The question in this case is not whether the Clean Water Act is constitutional. Instead, the question is whether the agency can interpret “navigable waters” to include marshes in the absence of clear direction from Congress. The dispute comes from the fact that the wetlands here do not directly flow into another body of water and are therefore not an active part of interstate commerce.
It is a fundamental principle of American law that states cannot regulate an area of policy where the federal government already regulates. Therefore, if wetlands are under the authority of the federal government, they are not subject to overlapping state regulation. A decision, in this case curtailing the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency, would open the door for more state government decision making.
However, even though the federal government’s regulation of waterways is tied primarily to economic activity, it also is about refereeing disputes among states. Since the founding of the U.S., there has been concern about a state making decisions regulating a waterway within its borders that have implications for another state “downstream.”
This case, and its potentially dramatic implications, is reflected by the fact that twenty-six states collectively and Alaska individually have filed legal briefs supporting the Sacketts. “By construing the Clean Water Act to reach places with only tenuous connections to navigable, interstate waters,…[the Environmental Protection Agency] would saddle States with implementing a vast scheme of federal water regulation. States’ own efforts at conservation, tailored to local needs, would fall by the wayside.”
But the division among the states is equally clear, as seventeen states and Washington D.C. collectively and Colorado individually, have filed legal briefs supporting the Environmental Protection Agency. “Each of the forty-eight contiguous States contains waters that are downstream from other States and thus relies on the [Clean Water Act’s] federal standards to protect their waters from pollutants that are discharged into wetlands in upstream States.”
Traditionally, the courts have given executive branch agencies a lot of leeway to interpret the will of Congress when statutory language is vague. This is known as “Chevron deference.” The Supreme Court ruled in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council in 1984 that when a statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to executive branch agency interpretation as long as it is reasonable. However, the Supreme Court has grown more skeptical of agency power and become less willing to defer. For example, last June 30 the court ruled against the Environmental Protection Agency in a case involving its exercise of regulatory power under the Clean Air Act.
During oral argument in Sacket v. Environmental Protection Agency on Oct. 3, the Sackett’s attorney told the court that navigable waters should be defined to only include waters that flow into other waters – therefore potentially involved in commercial activity. Several justices seemed concerned that if the agency could regulate a body of water, even if it did not connect to any other body of water, there would be no limit to the agency’s authority. There was extended discussion of whether it matters if two bodies of water are not connected but are adjacent to one another; or if the barrier between them is manufactured or natural. The justices also wondered about the implications for private landowners who might inadvertently violate federal policy as they develop their property.
But some of the justices seemed skeptical of the Sackett’s argument. For example, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that in the 50 years since the act was passed, the agency has consistently said wetlands and other waters are covered, even when they do not flow into other waters. Near the end of the argument, Justice Kavanaugh wondered whether bringing clarity to the language of the act was the responsibility of Congress rather than the courts.
Most of the justices seemed to be struggling with how to best achieve a balance between protecting U.S. waterways and protecting private property ownership. Interestingly, the government attorney noted to the justices that the Environmental Protection Agency was working on a new rule regarding navigable waters and wetlands that would clarify situations like the one at issue in this case. The goal is to issue the new rule by December.
It is impossible to predict what the court will do in any given case, but it may be that a new rule would further clarify the meaning of “navigable waters” thus allowing private citizens like the Sacketts to move forward in developing their property. The new rule could retain substantial portions of the agency’s authority over waterways. Such a rule may allow the Supreme Court to withdraw from the dispute, seeing it as already settled.
