By Morgan Thomas, Policy Associate

When going to vote, most people do not think about the technology behind the equipment they are using. They wait in line, show their ID, fill out their ballot, scan it into a machine, grab the free sticker and go about their day. Very little, if any, thought is given to how we got here. With questions looming about election integrity and election technology systems, it is important to understand the election technology we have today.

The Evolution of Election Technology

From colonial times through the 1880s, elections were held orally through yeas or nays on courthouse steps. This method of voting, called viva voce, meaning “with the living voice,” was how George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln would have been voted into office.

In the late 1880s, everything shifted when the Acme Voting Machine was invented. The Acme Voting Machine was aimed at securing an honest vote. It did so by providing a way for poll overseers to detect additional voter fraud. The machine allowed poll overseers to count the exact number of ballots cast compared to registered voters. It had a tabulator activated by a lever mechanism that released the ballot into the box. A tabulator is a computing machine that reads and summarizes data, such as punched cards, producing lists or totals. Prior to this invention, there was no way of ensuring only one vote per person. Integrity was left in the hands of the voter, who would often swear on the Bible in front of a Judge that they were indeed the person they claimed to be and that it was their first and only vote. This subsequently allowed many voters to cast their vote multiple times.

Although the Acme Voting Machine was great at tabulating votes and aided in voter fraud prevention, the integrity of the count was often questionable. Reportedly, election officials could “tear” or “mark” a ballot to make it invalid. They could even place more ballots in the box for additional votes. This led to the development of the lever-style voting machine a decade later.

In 1892, the first Lever Style Voting Machine was used in Lockport, New York, to make voting faster and more accurate. Voters would pull a large handle to close the machine’s curtains ensuring a secret ballot. Then, a voter would see a board with candidate names, offices and parties. Each candidate’s name, office and party were arranged in a row with small levers directly above them for voters to choose from. Once a voter pushed down a lever, the machine would lock to prevent a duplicate vote. While this was a significant improvement, a myriad of problems remained. The maintenance required was complex, the machine was inaccessible to voters with physical disabilities and the labels with candidate information were hard to read. The most critical fault was that the lever machines did not record an independent vote. Independent records were needed if an election was audited or required a recount. This led to the voting technology enhancement, “The Coyle.”

The Coyle was the first voting machine to turn a punch card into a ballot. Martin A. Coyle developed the Coyle Voting Machine in 1961 in Ohio. The Coyle weighed roughly 33 pounds and cost $650, which today equates to about $6,478.52. The Coyle machine used a plain card ballot with no perforated holes, and the name of each candidate was printed on every ballot. It was essentially an electronic hole punch that produced a ballot that allowed voters to look and ensure the ballot was marked accurately. The Coyle was too expensive for states to purchase in large quantities, and in contrast to lever-style voting machines, the Coyle did not have a lever that pulled a privacy curtain, which created privacy concerns.

The idea of punch card voting had been around since the 1890s, but the first successful system was not developed until 1965, when Joseph P. Harris developed the Votomatic punch-card system. By the 1966 Presidential Election, the Votomatic was used by 37.3% of voters in the U.S. The system offered a carefully designed punch card ballot with candidate names printed on the pages of the ballot holder rather than a single card. In contrast to the Coyle, the Votomatic was only 6 pounds and was sold for $185, which is equivalent to $1,547 today. The lower cost allowed jurisdictions to place more voting machines in each polling place. Punch card voting machines remained the most common voting method until they received considerable criticism after the 2000 Presidential Election and Florida’s “hanging chads.”

In 2000, the U.S. presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore was determined by the election results in Florida. The results of the election were slowed for more than a month due to ballot counting and recounting. The ballots caused significant contention around voter intent because they were visually confusing. The punch card ballot had two columns of candidates’ names that were separated by a middle column of squares that had to be punched through. The perforated square that lined up with the candidate’s names was referred to as a “chad.” On many ballots, these punches or “chads,” did not go all the way through, creating what was called a “hanging chad.” Upon recount, election workers were tasked with determining the voter’s intent—did they intend to vote for that “hanging chad” candidate or did they accidentally start to mark that candidate and then select another? Additionally, due to a misalignment of the marks and names, many believe some voters incorrectly marked Pat Buchanan, a third-party Presidential candidate. The case ultimately went to the Florida Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of Bush. The 2000 election fiasco resulted in numerous lawsuits and challenges surrounding the accuracy of punch card voting machines and how to count a vote as valid.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was the federal response to this outrage. HAVA was created to establish minimum election administration standards for states. One of the key byproducts of HAVA was the creation of the Election Administration Commission, commonly known as the EAC, which helps states meet these standards by creating voting system guidelines, conducting research and maintaining the voting system certification program. In addition to establishing voting standards and procedures, HAVA also required states to update and upgrade their voting equipment as well as improve voting accessibility for people with disabilities. HAVA provided funding for states to replace their punch card machines with newer machines, such as Direct Recordings Electronic Systems (DREs) or Optical Scanners. HAVA also required polling places to have at least one voting machine that allows voters with disabilities to vote both privately and independently. This resulted in a substantial increase in electronic voting machines.

Present Day Technology

DREs and Optical Scanners are what voters have likely used to vote in recent history. DREs require voters to make their selections using a touch-screen monitor. Many, but certainly not all, produce what is known as a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), which is a printed record or copy of the voter’s selections. VVPAT provides more security and aids in recounting votes should a recount be called. Today, most DREs without VVPAT functionality have been replaced with updated technology that does. However, following the 2020 election many DRE models have succumbed to scrutiny surrounding touch screen calibration errors incorrectly registering voters’ choices and potential security vulnerabilities. DRE vendors that have VVPAT capability include, but are not limited to: Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Dominion Voting Systems and MicroVote. While the number of jurisdictions using DREs has fallen, 16 states have jurisdictions that still utilize DREs for their elections. Of those 16 states that still use DREs without VVPATs are Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee and Texas.  

Ballot Marking Devices were another byproduct of HAVA. (BMDs) support voters with disabilities by offering screen contrast adjustment, large text, audio-tactile interfaces and headphones to read the candidates out loud. They even have sip-and-puff capabilities for voters with dexterity impairments. BMDs present an electronic ballot that allows voters to electronically select their candidate and then produce a human-readable paper ballot. However, contrary to DREs, which keep a record directly in the computer’s memory, BMDs do not keep a record of voters’ selections. Instead, BMDs either make pre-printed ballots or print summaries of voter selections. It is important to note that while a BMD can aid voters with disabilities, the handling of a paper ballot at any point still makes it inaccessible. For example, a voter who is blind cannot verify a paper ballot independently or privately. Nonetheless, once the ballots have been verified, they are then often fed into an optical scanner for tabulation.

Optical scanners work differently from DREs. They include both hand-fed and batch-fed scanners to tabulate votes. Voters make their selections by filling in an oval, an arrow, or a box for each selection on their ballot. Then those ballots are tabulated in a hand-fed or batch-fed optical scanner. Most larger polling locations have one or more batch-fed optical scanners.

Future Technology

In recent years, there have been numerous discussions surrounding innovative voting techniques, such as internet voting or voting via smartphone apps. While many would love to be able to vote from their electronic devices at home, free from long lines, traffic and chaotic political demonstrations, that will not be happening for everyone just yet. Currently there is no technology thatyguarantees voting security and verifiability of a ballot over the internet. Scientists have identified several potential vulnerabilities and risks that come with online voting, regardless of the platform. Some of those risks include  malware, service attacks, voter information security, voter authentication, ballot protection, lack of VVPAT and more. There is a fine balance between mitigating security issues and accessibility.

However, several counties have begun to test alternative voting technology through a secure voting app or portal. Some states, including West Virginia, Utah and Colorado, have conducted tests of the online voting app Voatz as a means for absentee overseas voters, including military personnel and voters with disabilities, to vote in their home state. Another well-known online voting platform is Democracy Live. Democracy Live partnered with Amazon and Microsoft to create an OmniBallot Portal and an OmniBallot Tablet. The OmniBallot Portal is a remote voting tool for voters with disabilities, individuals in the military and overseas voters. A remote voting tool is an electronic interface system that allows the voter to cast their ballot using their own compatible devices. The OmniBallot Tablet is a ballot-marking device that allows voters to mark their selection on the tablet itself at polling locations. Currently, the OmniBallot Portal is the most deployed voting portal in the U.S.

However, researchers found that any adversary with remote access to the smartphone device or portal could alter a person’s vote. While voting from a mobile device would increase voter accessibility, there is still a great deal of research to be done. Most of that mobile voting research is being funded by Tusk Philanthropies, an organization that is funding election technology research through Assembly Voting and the Open-Source Election Technology Institute. Assembly Voting is an election technology company in Demark, and the OSET Institute is a U.S. nonprofit that is focused on election technology and research. Bradley Tusk has already conducted a few small-scale, mobile-phone voting projects across the U.S. in recent years. Those projects have been for voters with disabilities and U.S. citizens living abroad in a select number of districts, but there is still a great deal of security concerns to mitigate.

Nonetheless, as it stands, many security experts still consider paper ballots to be the most secure form of voting. States should continue migrating to systems that provide a VVPAT and replace aging systems. Upgrading outdated voting equipment can help election administrators minimize security risks and breakdowns while also helping restore public confidence in elections.

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